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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Psychology and Religious Bias
In the last half century, psychologists and other social
scientists have played a leading role in our culture's efforts
to curb prejudice. Long before the general public was concerned
about ethnic prejudice, psychologists were studying it as
a social problem (e.g., Katz & Braly, 1933). Psychologists
have often been first to advocate social policies such as
affirmative action or the adoption of non-sexist language.
Despite this longstanding commitment to tolerance, research
has found that psychologists, too, sometimes evidence biases.
In the past, most research of this nature has explored whether
clinicians hold class, race, or sex biases. However, recently,
evidence of another sort or bias, anti-religious bias, has
been reported. A brief review of that literature finds:
1) Religion and religious people have been
described in a predominantly negative
fashion in the psychological literature
(see Gartner, 1982 for a review)
,
though
recently the literature has reflected a
shift away from this monolithically
1
negative stance (Bergin, 1983; Saffady,
1976)
.
2) Research on psychologists finds them to
be unusually anti-religious. One study
(Nix, 1978) found that 15% to 40% of the
psychologists studied reported anti-
religious attitudes, depending on how one
defined the term. This is a dramatically
higher figure than has been found among the
general American population (Princeton
Religious Research Center, 1982). While the
general tendency for the educated to be less
favorable towards formal/traditional religion
(Argyle & Beit-Hallami, 1975) is undoubtedly
a factor, it does not explain the entire
discrepancy. Physical Scientists, v^o have
an equal amount of education, have been found
to evaluate religion more favorably than social
scientists (Hoge & Keeter, 1976) . Moreover,
psychologists have been found to be the most
anti-religious of the social scientists
(McClintock, 1965)
.
3) A number of religious psychologists have
claimed that the field is anti-religious,
stigmatizing those who hold religious beliefs
3(Bergin, 1980, 1983; Clement, 1978; Soiled,
1978; Van Leeuwen, 1983; Vitz, 1977).
4) Several authors have argued that many of
the widely used personality tests are biased
against religious people (Bergin, 1983;
Gartner, 1981, 1983: Goldsmith & Harrig, 1978;
Goldsmith & Sandbom, 1982; Vitz, 1982).
5) Content-Analysis of psychology texts
reveal that religious experience and behavior
is rarely discussed, despite the fact that
over 3/4 of the world is religious in some
fashion (Spika & Goldsmith, 1981; Vitz, 1982b).
Perhaps the most important question is how might
psychologists' religious attitudes affect their professional
conduct toward religious individuals? Nix (1978) found that,
v^ile 15-40% of her sample was anti-religious, only 1% said
they would attempt to discourage a client's religious belief,
which suggests that psychologists may well be able to respect
their client's beliefs. On the other hand, Gartner (1982)
found, in an analogue study on clinical psychology graduate
admissions, that professors of clinical psychology were less
likely to admit a Born Again Christian applicant and an identical
non-religious applicant. This suggests that religious bias
may affect some professional decisions.
A particularly important professional decision vvhich
4psychologists frequently make is a judginent concerning a client's
degree of psychopathology. m the last 20 years this process
has come under great scrutiny, both because of the great impact
it can have on clients' lives, and because of the great potential
for bias in what is in part a subjective judgment. The aim
of this study is to assess the extent to which psychologists'
clinical judgment may be influenced by a patient's ideological
orientation. Relevant literature on bias in clinical judgment
and values and psychotherapy are reviewed below.
Clinical Judgment Studies
The suspicion that prejudice might influence therapists'
clinical judgments is not new. Attention to the problem was
first aroused by Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) who found
that lower class patients were more often assigned psychotic
and other severe diagnoses than upper and middle class patients.
This, plus the criticisms of labeling theorists and others
such as Thomas Szaz (1974) about the diagnostic process, and
the concern of the burgeoning community mental health movement
for the delivery of quality mental health services to the
poor served to make this a major issue in the field (Abramowitz
& Dokecki, 1977). Research has focused on the influence of
such factors as social class, race, sex and values on clinical
decision making. The influence of religion, till now, has
5been ignored, though the methods used in these previous studies
could easily be adapted for research of this type.
Clinical judgment research can be almost exclusively
divided into two groups: archival and analogue type studies
(Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977). Archival, or as they are sometimes
called, epidemiological studies, involve examining the records
of a mental health institution to see if differences can be
found in the classification and treatment of socially marginal
people. For example, it has been found that lower class patients
are more often given severe diagnoses, less often accepted
for psychotherapeutic treatment and usually seen for fewer
sessions (Myers & Schaffer, 1954; Winder & Hersko, 1955)
.
The problem with such research is that positive findings are
consistent with, rather than univocally supportive of the
bias explanation. These results may also reflect genuine
differences between the classes in severity of pathology and
resistance to psychological services. As the data is
correlational, questions of causation remain moot. One solution
to this dilemma is to include therapist characteristics as
a variable in the study. For example, Yamamoto et al. (1967)
found that therapists v*io were high in prejudice were less
likely to have black patients in their long-term caseload.
Results of this sort make one more confident in concluding
that prejudice has, in some cases, exerted an influence on
clinical judgment. Unfortunately few studies include such
6factors
.
The second major research strategy, the analogue study,
borrows its methodology from experimental social psychology.
Clinicians are given case material in v^ich possible elicitors
of bias (e.g., class, race, etc.) are systematically varied.
For example, clinicians were found to evaluate patients more
negatively on the basis of their Rorschach protocols v^en
they were led to believe that the responses were produced
by lower class patients (Levy & Kahn. 1970). With this type
of research, we can be more certain that clinicians' evaluations
are being influenced by knowledge of the hypothetical patient's
group membership, as all other factors are held constant.
In this way analogue studies are better controlled than archival
studies. Inasmuch as they involve the systematic manipulation
of variables they are experimental rather than correlational,
and causal conclusions are more easily drawn. On the other
hand, analogue studies do not measure "real life" behavior,
as archival studies do. People do not always behave as their
responses on a questionnaire might suggest (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1977) . For this reason it is sometimes thought that converging
evidence of bias fron both archival and analogue studies is
more convincing than either source alone (Abramowitz & Dokecki,
1977)
.
Analogue studies face another problem. Though positive
results suggest that the clinician is responding to the
7hypothetical patient's group membership, they do not assure
us that prejudice is at work. In an analogue study the clinician
is given relatively meager information compared to that he
might normally have. Using his knowledge of the rate of mental
illness in a particular population, he may allow that information
to in fact guide his "best guess" about the case (Abramowitz
& Dokecki, 1977). Put in statistical terms, he is in part,
using the group mean to maximize his chances of being correct.
As with the archival studies, one way to manage the problem
is to study therapist factors. Abramowitz et al. (1973) found
that conservative clinicians were more likely to stigmatize
a political dissident. Results of this sort suggest that
clinicians are not simply using well known statistical norms
to guide their decisions, but are in fact affected by bias.
Listed in Charts 1 and 2 are some of the stimuli and
dependent variables v\^ich have been used in past analogue
studies. By far the most commonly used stimuli is a written
case history on client description. Most dependent variables
consist of bipolar rating scales of some kind, usually devised
by the experimenter. Questions concerning diagnosis, prognosis,
pathology and treatment recommendations are the most common
dependent variables.
Below is a list of dependent variables used by Wallach
and Strupp (1960) though some are redundant with variables
already mentioned, the entire group are listed here, because
CHART 1
(based on review by Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1972)
Stimuli Used in Analogue Studies of Clinical Judgment
History/description
Test data (e.g., personality test score
Rorschach protocols)
Audiotaped interviews
Videotaped interviews
Live interview
Interview transcript
Adjective description
Family history/description
Group therapy incident
Gender
CHART 2
(based on review by Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977,
except v^ere indicated)
Dependent Variables Used in Analogue Studies
of Clinical Judgment
Diagnosis
Prognosis
Open-ended personality description
Personality rating scale
Semantic differential
Treatment recommendations
Family diagnostic evaluation
Open-ended therapeutic response to videotaped session
Educational and vocational oriented indicators
Adjective check list
Manifest need list
Frequency of encouraging statements made in role play
Frequency of "relationship building" statements
Severity of disturbance (Koppel & Farina, 1971)
Recommendation for discharge (Koppel & Farina, 1971)
Need for hospitalization (Blake, 1973)
Likability (Stein et al., 1972)
Discomfort with patient (Stein et al., 1972)
Interest in treating (Stein et al., 1972)
Potential for treatment (Blake, 1973)
9tneir scale is the most comprehensive currently in the literature:
Diagnosis
Ego strength
Anxiety
Ego strength
Insight
Emotional maturity
Social adjustment
Degree of disturbance
Similarity to patients now have in therapy
Kind of treatment recommended
Motivation
Chance of acting out
Recommended frequency of sessions
Would you make extensive changes in character
structure
Recommended length of treatment
Permissiveness
Encourage free association
Change usual therapeutic approach
Recommendations to patient
Prognosis with therapy
Prognosis without therapy
Willingness to accept patient into treatment
Ease of empathy with patient
Environmental stress
Therapists' attitude
There is not room here to fully review the results found
in this literature (see Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977; Gurman
& Razin, 1977)
. A brief overview is enlightening. The first
patient attribute intensively studied with these techniques
was social class. More than any other factor studied since,
social class was found to have a consistent effect on clinical
judgment: "...research suggests that lower class individuals
are clinically devalued more consistently than are minority
persons, women or social nonconformists" (Abramowitz & Dokecki,
1977, p. 464) . These findings are consistent with literature
on what has been called the YAVIS (Young, Attractive, Verbal,
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Intelligent, Successful) Client. Research (Garfield & Bergin,
1978) shows that this type of patient, v^o is of course
disproportionately represented among the upper classes, is
preferred by most therapists and tends to benefit most from
psychological services.
The prediction that clinicians would evaluate racial
minorities more negatively than caucasions has not been
substantiated (Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977; Sattler, 1977).
Both archival and analogue studies have failed to show a consistent
anti-black bias. The majority of studies produced null results.
Some have found pro-black responses among white and black
clinicians. Anti-black findings are the most rare. One of
the few studies to find that blacks were given a more severe
diagnosis admittedly used a highly ambiguous case (Blake,
1973)
.
Even in this study subjects did not differentiate
the black and v*iite patient on such variables as adequacy
of ego function, interest in treating or prognosis.
While clear-cut bias has not been found, there is evidence
that clinicians attend to race vdien making clinical judgments.
Goldstone (1971), for example, found that blacks were rated
better than v^ites if both were described as "good therapy
risks" but worse if both vere described as "poor risks."
The investigator concludes that minority status is seen as
a handicap; therefore, if a black is a good risk he must be
exceptionally able in order to overcome his handicap. If
11
he is a "poor risk" then he most likely is in worse shape
than a comparable white patient who does not have an extra
impediment.
It is also possible that the clinicians participating
in such studies are "wise" to the analogue method and thus,
bend over backwards to avoid appearing prejudiced. As Abramowitz
and Dokecki (1977) note, the studies in this area are virtually
devoid of manifestation checks.
Though clinicians have been found to hold sex role stereotypes
(Rabkin, 1977)
,
there has been little support for the notion
that they are biased against women (Abramowitz & Dokecki,
1977)
.
As with minorities, however, clinicians have been
found to respond differently to female clients. Male clinicians
actually tend to prefer their female patients and see them
for more sessions. However, that extra degree of interest
sometimes has sexualized or voyeuristic overtones (Abramowitz
& Dokecki, 1977). For example, psychiatric residents show
more TAT cards concerning romantic themes to women (Mas ley
& Harris, 1969; Siskind, 1973). One study worth noting did
find bias against women using neither the archival or analogue
method. Broverman et al. (1970) found that clinicians' ratings
of the ideal man were closer to their ratings of the ideal
person than were their ratings of the ideal woman.
Next to patient social class, patient's values have most
consistently been found to affect clinicians' judgmentation
12
(Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977). However, even results in this
area have been mixed. Of the ten studies reviewed by Abramowitz
and Dokecki (1977), three found positive results, three null
findings, and four mixed results. They report two studies
(Abramowitz et al., 1973; Braginski & Braginski, 1974) which
reported bias against the political dissident, especially
ainong Conservative clinicians. More mixed results on patient
sex type, which could be considered a value dimension, have
been found. Two studies (Schlosberg & Pietrofesa, 1973; Thomas
& Steward, 1971) found that women contemplating masculine
occupations were judged more pathological. However, another
set of investigators (Abramowitz et al., 1976) failed to replicate
these findings. Yet another study found feminine typed women
elicited more empathy and liking than masculine typed, but
that the masculine typed were judged more mature (Gomes &
Abramowitz, 1976)
.
At least three studies on the influence of a client's
religious values on clinical judgment have been reported.
Using a sample of only three clinicians, Gerrard (1968) found
that they were more likely to predict that abnormal MMPI scores
came from a Christian snake-handling sect than a conventional
church, despite the fact that research has shown no difference
between these groups on the MMPI (Tellegen et al., 1969).
Clearly, more research is needed in the area of religious
values and clinical judgment. However, Hong (1978) found
13
that seminary students did not differ in their clinical ratings
in response to manipulations of the client's religious orientation
or type of conversion. l^wis (1983) found that clinicians
listening to a taped interview with a depressed woman did
not differ in their ratings when the patient used religious
language and was identified as an evangelical Christian.
Perhaps the final question one might ask of this literature
is "Why does it matter if prejudice influences clinical judgment?"
There are several answers to this question. First, as the
labeling theorists of the 1960 's were the first to point out,
diagnostic labels can have a stigmatizing effect on the
individual. If clinicians are prone to assign more severe
labels to certain groups, that action has tangible political,
economic, social and psychological negative consequences for
the individuals in those groups. Secondly, members of groups
not favored by psychologists may find the path to psychological
services they need partially blocked. The reader will recall
that lower class patients, for exairple, are less often accepted
as patients, usually assigned to less skilled personnel and
seen for fewer sessions than middle or upper class patients
(Myers & Shaeffer, 1954; Winder & Hersko, 1955) . More tangible,
but no less important, how will the therapist's attitude toward
the patient affect his ability to provide his normal level
of quality services? Concerning this question, Hans Strupp
wrote:
14
...in all the investigations the therapist's
attitude toward the patient as rated by
himself showed a highly significant statistical
relationship to his clinical judgments
and treatment plans, and v^ere such data
was obtained, to the emotional tones of
his communications, in recent studies,
an item v^iich inquired whether the therapist
felt warmly toward the patient proved
particularly predictive. For example,
negative attitudes toward the patient
were found to be correlated with a more
unfavorable diagnosis and prognosis, with
recommendations for greater strictness
and activity on the part of the therapist;
with recommendations for less frequent
interviews; with greater unwillingness
to treat him...
It is yet unknown to v*iat extent the patient
may fulfill the therapist's unverbalized
prophecy. This much, however, is clear.
In the absence of a keen and abiding interest
and dedication to the part of the therapist,
the patient cannot marshal the necessary
strength and energy to fight his way to
a healthier adaptation, or, to use Dr.
Alexander's felicitous term, he cannot
undergo a corrective emotional experience.
(Strupp, 1963, p. 78)
Further, therapists' negative attitudes towards marginal
groups may create/interact with the defensiveness that some
members of those groups might feel v*ien entering therapy.
Relating this point to our topic. King (1978) found that only
a minute percentage of the Evangelical Christians in his sample
said they would consider seeking psychological services even
if they had a psychological problem. The most common reason
subjects gave was their fear that the therapist would misunderstand
or challenge their faith. When one considers tliat Evangelical
Christians compose 17% of this nation's population (Princeton
15
Religious Research Center, 1982) , the scope of the problem
becomes apparent. Put in this context, it appears to be of
more than academic interest to discover if psychologists are
biased in their clinical judgments of the religious.
Values and Therapy
Between the late fifties and early seventies, psychologists
showed a great deal of interest in the relationship of values
to therapy. Reviews of the literature (Beutler, 1972; Ehrlich
& Weiner, 1961; Kessell & McBrearty, 1967; Patterson, 1959)
appear to converge on four basic findings, each of which has
implications for our topic.
!• In many cases therapists appear to communicate their
values to their patients
It has long been a truism that therapists should not
"impose their values" on their clients. Initially, this position
grew out of psychoanalytic theory vdiich argued that any attempts
at moral persuasion would interfere with the interpretive
process. This stance of value neutrality was later buttressed
by the emergence of the client centered approach vAiich emphasized
the therapist's non-directive role in helping the client to
choose his own values.
In the late fifties and early sixties, however, psychologists
and other clinicians began to question whether the noble goal
16
of value neutrality was really possible in the context of
the therapeutic relationship. Beutler (1972) and Kessell
and McBrearty (1967) cite almost a hundred authors writing
during this period v^o came to the conclusion that it was
not possible, indeed, as early as 1953, the American Psychological
Association explicitly state in their code of ethics that
the values of the psychotherapist are expressed in the clinical
relationship. Wolf (1956) found that 40% of his New York
therapist sample believed that the values of the therapist
have direct influence on the client. Only 25% denied it.
In a more recent survey (Roche Labs, 1974) , 65% of the
psychiatrists polled agreed that "Psychiatrists attempt to
influence patients to 'adjust' to the psychiatrists' own [sex
role ] stereotypes .
"
The conclusion that the values of the mental health
professional are inevitably expressed to the patient rests
on two arguments. First, as London (1964)
,
among others,
has suggested, the goals of psychotherapy itself rests on
implicit value assuitptions . Some clinicians have obscured
this point in the past by describing abnormality and treatment
in the language of the medical model. Such an analogy inplies
that mental health, like physical health, can be defined in
objective terms, v\^en in fact psychological theories of "the
Good," to borrow Plato's term, are usually based on untested
and often untestable value assumptions. One theory's concept
17
of health may not agree with others.
The second argument is that therapists communicate their
values indirectly, sometimes unconsciously, even if they refrain
from directly imposing them. It is widely acknowledged by
psychologists that people communicate a great deal about themselves
in a variety of verbal and nonverbal ways that they may not
recognize or be able to control. We can only conclude that
this must also be true of psychologists themselves and their
values. Meehl (1959) provides an example:
I think it is naive to assume that because
a therapist does not explicitly assert
to his patient that he, the therapist,
has certain views about religion, or values
or philosophy of life, therefore he is
not presenting to the patient any value
model. Surely one does not have to engage
in conversation regarding his own moral
philosophy in order to get across the
message
.
Consider, for example, the problem of
guilt for one's thoughts. There are important
(and psychologically significant) differences
here between Roman Catholics, Lutherans
and Humanists. To a Lutheran, objective
guilt does attach to evil thoughts. To
a Roman Catholic, objective guilt attaches
to evil thoughts only under certain conditions
(e.g., v*ien the individual freely dwells
on them instead of struggling against
them) . To most Humanists thoughts vAiich
do not result in overt actions are free
of guilt. I have listened to enough tape
recordings to believe that in reflection,
interpretation or leading questions regarding
a patient's thoughts, therapists often
tip their hand, by inflection or choice
of words as to v^ere they stand in this
regard: A message v^ich says "Come now,
you and I are both rational, mature,
emancipated individuals, and therefore
18
we know that a person ought not feel guilty
about his fantasies. (Meehl, 1959, pg. 256)
The hypothesis v*iich follows from this discussion is
that some therapists may communicate values antithetical to
those of their clients, especially v^en their client subscribes
to an extreme ideological belief system. Though there are
numerous anecdotes which have been told to the author which
are consistent with this hypothesis, it has never been tested
empirically. Nix's (1978) finding that only one percent of
her sample claimed that they discourage the religious beliefs
of their clients, suggest that the attempted value influence
may not be of a conscious overt nature. Almost half of her
sample said they would "explore" the client's religious beliefs.
As in the above example provided by Meehl, the therapist's
own views may seep through in this "exploration process."
2. Patients tend to adopt their therapists' values
If therapists do indeed communicate their values, one
would expect that many patients might iDe receptive to adopting
those values. Petoney (1966) found that outpatients at a
client centered counseling center at the University of Chicago
moved closer to their therapists' values during the course
of therapy. Petoney suggested that his results could be explained
in two ways. Either the therapist communicates his values
to the client, or the client as a result of therapy, acquires
a more mature healthy approach to living and hence approximates
19
more closely the orientation of his therapist.
Welkowitz, Cohen and Ortmeyer (1967) found results more
consistent with the former explanation. They found that patients
were closer in values to their own therapists than were randomly
assigned therapist patient dyads, suggesting that patients
are indeed adopting the values of their particular therapist,
rather than general "healthy" therapist values. (Initial
patient selection did not seem to be a factor, as therapists
were assigned cases by an intake worker on the basis of
availability.) Others (Burdock et al., 1960; Morris et al.,
1960) have found that patients and therapists cannot be
distinguished on the basis of their values, further casting
doubt on the "healthy therapist values" hypothesis.
The competing notion that therapists may in fact be
influencing their patients' values is certainly consistent
with v^at social psychologists have discovered about the process
social influence. Patients are troubled people seeking help
from an authoritative expert with vhom they will become quite
intimate; this should make them receptive to influence on
a number of counts. Indeed, some authors have tried to explain
the entire process of psychotherapy in terms of the social
influence literature (Beutler, 1971; Strong, 1978). Behavioral
principles might also be invoked to explain this phenomenon.
Truax (1966) analyzed transcripts from client centered therapy
and noticed that the therapists selectively reinforced with
20
a supportive remark or gesture statements v^ich were consistent
with the humanistic world-view after v^^ich the frequency of
such verbal behavior increased.
Undoubtedly, more research is needed on how, why and
when client's values change to draw any firm conclusions.
It would be interesting to see if religious clients become
less religious after therapy than a matched waiting list control,
or to broaden the question, in v^iat, if any, way they would
change.
3. Patients tend to be rated as more improved if they adopt
their therapist's values
The first study of this type was done by Rosenthal (1955)
who found that improved patients tended to revise their values
in the direction of the therapist. Though he did not obtain
significant results on the Al Iport-Vemon-Lindzey scale of
values, he did on a moral values scale v*iich measured moral
beliefs concerning sex, aggression and authority. This suggests
that some value content may be more closely associated with
rated improvement than others. Obviously moral beliefs concerning
sex, aggression and authority are closely connected to religious
values (an examination of the actual items on the scale confirms
this, e.g., "Girls should come to the marriage bed as virgins,"
is a belief of traditional Judaism and Christianity) . The
fact that these were the values found to be relevant to therapeutic
outcome suggests that there is need for more empirical study
21
of psychotherapy and religious values. Unfortunately, Rosenthal
does not report if improved patients become more liberal or
conservative in their views, only that they come closer to
the views of their therapist (not reported)
.
Tentative support for Rosenthal's findings was found
by Parloff
,
Iflund and Goldstein (1957) . They asked two
psychiatric inpatients to rank the importance of various issued
discussed in therapy. The patient who was rated as most improved
and subsequently discharged became relatively closer in his
rankings to those supplied by the therapist. Schrier (1953)
,
though not directly concerned with values, found that reported
improvement was related to the extent that the patient developed
identification with the therapist's need system. In v^at
is probably the most methodologically sound study in this
area, Welkowitz, Cohen and Ortmeyer (1967) found that therapists'
ratings of patient improvement was correlated with therapist
patient similarity on the Strong Vocational Interest Blank
and the Morris Way to Live Scale. Finally, in a somev^at
related study. Burdock et al. (1960) found that therapists
vAio adopted the interest patterns of their supervisors were
rated by their supervisors as better adjusted.
Partially contradictory findings were found in three
studies (Farson, 1961; Holzman, 1961; Nawas & Landfield, 1963)
.
Farson (1961) found adoption of the therapist's values to
be related to outcome only among less adjusted and less competent
22
clinicians. Kessel and McBrearty (1967) suggest that the
difference in Parson's and Rosenthal's findings may be due
to the fact that Rosenthal's sample was composed of
psychoanalytically oriented psychiatric residents while Parson
studied client centered therapists. These two orientations
have different value systems themselves, with client centered
therapists sometimes being more adamant about not influencing
client values. One could also speculate that psychiatric
residents may not be the most competent clinicians. Holzman
(1961) found that successful outpatients tended to adopt their
therapist's values, but that the opposite was true of inpatients.
Finally, Nawas and Landfield (1963) reported nonsignificant
results which seemed contrary to those of Rosenthal. However,
v^ien they added more subjects to their sample (Landfield &
Nawas, 1964) they indeed did find that improved patients tended
to shift their real self-ratings closer to the therapist's
ideal self-ratings, provided it was described in the patient's
language.
As with many of the other findings we have reviewed,
these are almost entirely correlational, and more than one
plausible explanation presents itself. Taking these results
at face value, the acceptance of a therapist's values may
in some way be related to improvement in therapy. This may
be because the therapist's values are "healthier." An alternate
explanation is that increasing value congruence may be one
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cause/result of increased intimacy and receptivity to therapeutic
influence, if one wanted to be a bit nxDre skeptical, one
could suggest that clients adopt their therapists' values
may be rated as more improved without actually being so, because
they now appear more attractive to the therapist whose values
they have accepted. The fact that some studies such as Rosenthal
(1955) and Holzman (1961) have used outcome criteria more
objective than therapists' ratings, such as independent interviews,
personality tests or objective data, makes this explanation
less likely. However, as some (Bergin, 1983; Gartner, 1981,
1983b; Goldsmith & Harrig, 1978; Goldsmith & Sandborn, 1982;
Vitz, 1982) have suggested, personality tests and "independent"
interviewers can share many of the therapists' value biases.
Thus, further analogue research on therapist-patient value
congruence and clinical judgment is needed to supplement these
correlational findings.
4. Patients tend to improve more with therapists vho initially
share their values to a moderate degree and do worse
with therapists v^o are highly dissimilar
The research reviewed above examined the relationship
between value change during therapy and therapy outcome.
Research has also been done on the effect of initial
therapist-patient value similarity on outcome. Cook (1966)
had prospective clients at a college counseling center and
their clinical staff fill out the Al Iport-Vemon-Lindzey scale
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of values. He then assigned clients to either a high, medium
or low similarity therapist. He discovered a curvilinear
relationship between similarity and outcome. His results
showed that clients working with a medium similarity therapist
did the best, followed by the high similarity group, with
the low similarity group doing the worst. This finding is
paralleled by others (Berzin, 1977) v^ich have found a curvilinear
relationship between patient-therapist personality similarity
and therapy outcome. Perhaps too high a degree of similarity
makes it hard for the therapist to be objective, as his own
conflicts and biases may be confounded with those of the patient.
On the other hand, too little similarity may make it difficult
for the therapist to empathize with the client or for the
client to trust the therapist. A substantial number of authors
agree that a high degree of value dissimilarity is an impediment
to therapy (Beutler, 1972). On this basis, one might predict
that highly religious patients might not improve as much in
psychotherapy as less religious patients. Rosenbaum et al. (1956)
discovered just that.
In a more recent study (Pettit, Pettit & Welkowitz, 1974)
no relationship was found between value similarity and duration
of therapy though they used a large sample (104 therapists,
249 patients) . The investigators used factor analysis to
consolidate six major interest factors from several measures
(Rotary Club vs. aesthetic interest, authoritarian submission
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vs. independent, transcendentalism vs. concrete rational).
Is Religion Hazardous to Your Mental Health?
One of the most important criticisms of analogue research
on clinical judgment has been that clinicians' ratings may
be influenced by their knowledge about the rate of mental
illness in different populations, rather than prejudice.
Thus, in proposing an analogue study on religion and clinical
judgment, it is important to ask in advance, "Is there a greater
rate of mental illness among the religious?" For if there
is, our results may not be as easily interpretable.
A number of review articles on this topic can be found
in the psychological literature (Argyle & Beit-Hal lahmi, 1975;
Becker, 1971; Bergin, 1983; Dittes, 1971; Gartner, 1983b;
Sanua, 1969; Spilka & Werme, 1971; Stark, 1971). The oven^elming
finding, perhaps to the chagrin of both the pro- and
anti-religious, is that the religious appear to be no more
or less healthy than the nonreligious. As Sanua (1969) concludes:
"The results of the above review seem to indicate therefore,
that most studies show no relationship iDetween religion and
mental health..." (pg. 100). In a more recent review Bergin
(1983) summarizes his findings as follows:
The data provide surprising results.
Of the 30 effects tabulated, only 7 or
23% manifested the negative relationship
iDetween religion and mental health assumed
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by Ellis and others. Forty-seven percent
indicated a positive relationship, and
30% a zero relationship. Thus 77% of
the obtained results are contrary to the
negative effect of religion theory. Although
most of the results were not statistically
significant, the overall pattern was
interesting. Considering statistical
significance of results, 23 outcomes showed
no significant relationship, 5 showed
a positive relationship and 2 showed a
negative relationship. (Bergin, 1983,
pg. 176)
In reviewing the literature on religion and self-esteem,
an important aspect of mental health, Gartner (1983b) found
a remarkably similar distribution of results. Of the 18 studies
reviewed, 4 found the religious lower in self-esteem, 8 found
no difference, and 6 found the religious higher in self-esteem.
As in Bergin 's review, exactly 77% of the findings are inconsistent
with the proposed negative relationship between religion and
mental health.
As our study concerns the traditionally religious in
particular, literature on this degree of adjustment is particularly
relevant. In his review, Becker (1971) found three studies
v^ich compared theological liberals to theological conservatives.
Between the three studies a total of 18 personality tests
were administered to samples from these two populations, almost
vdiolly without results. Becker concludes:
The attempts of Rank, Lee and Dreger to
establish personality substrata for theological
liberals and theological conservatives
should tell us that this is an unproductive
line of pursuit. .. .While liberalism and
conservatism may be the source of much
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friction in theological circles, the content
of one's theology is apparently not the
dimension on which to establish the possible
correlates of psychological health. (Becker,
1971, pg. 399)
Clearly, more research is needed in this area, however.
Finally, one must ask if research has shown differences
with respect to adjustment between subjects who are more extremely
conservative in their theology, such as Evangelicals and
Fmdamentalists, and those v*io are liberal or nonreligious.
Unfortunately, there is no review article on this topic to
the author's knowledge. Goldsmith (1983) recently reviewed
the last decade of research v^ich appeared in The Journal
of Psychology and Theology
, an Evangelically oriented psychological
journal. He reports that "none of the studies reviewed reported
clear differences between (Evangelical) Christians and others
on general measures of personality or adjustment measures"
(pg. 15) . This author was able to find four relevant studies
in the psychological literature concerning the mental health
of Fundamentalists. Stanley (1963a, 1963b) was unable to
find any difference between fundamentalist Christians and
non-fundamentalist Christians on the MPI measure of neuroticism
or the Cattel and Schrier (1961) Neuroticism scale questionnaire.
In a later study Stanley et al. (1975) coirpared fundamentalists
to secular college students on the Eysenck Personality Inventory
and found the religious students to be less neurotic. Hassan
(1978) found the same results using the scale. Thus, the
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overall finding, once again, appears to be that no consistent
direction of differences can be found.
Going beyond the siniple question of v^ether the religious
are more or less well adjusted than the nonreligious, there
iray be differences in their respective types of adjustment.
There may be assets and liabilities inherent in both life
styles
.
Beginning vd.th religion's liabilities, it has repeatedly
been found that the religious are more "authoritarian" than
the nonreligious (Adomo et al., 1950; Dittes, 1971; Sanua,
1969; Simpson & Yinger, 1972; Spilka & Werme, 1971). However,
some authors (Hogan & Emler, 1978; Gartner, 1983b) have argued
that the F scale, the instrument used to measure authoritarianism,
is biased against subjects holding conservative and/or religious
values. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether or not
these results are simply an artifact of the instrument used.
This appears to be a common problem v*ien considering research
on religion and mental health. The traditionally religious
and psychologists, v^o are for the most part secular humanists,
have vastly different definitions of v^at constitutes mental
health. However, because psychologists incorporate their
notions into personality tests, they appear somehow objective
and scientific. If religious populations score poorly on
these tests, it is taken as evidence that they are impaired,
when they may simply hold different values. As Bergin (1983)
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has stated:
...mental health criteria ultimately consist
of standards based on subjective values
Thus, many of the "proofs" that religion
IS a source of disturbance are merely
tautologies that only prove that two sets
of personality measures constructed by
people holding the same premises are likely
to correlate. This circularity is obscured
by an empirical posture. (Bergin, 1983,
Pg. 172)
(For an example of such circularity see Gartner (1981) v*io
found that widely reported results showing the religious to
be less self-actualized than non-believers was a clear artifact
of the instrument, the Personal Orientation Inventory, which
was used in ttiese studies.)
These objections noted, there is evidence from other
sources v^ich is consistent with Adorno et al.'s (1950) original
contention that the religious are more strongly defended,
closed minded and constricted in their personalities (Spilka
& Werme, 1971; Dittes, 1971). For example, several studies
have found the religious to score higher on the MMPI L and
K scales (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Dittes, 1971; Martin
& Nichols, 1962) , considered to be measures of defensiveness.
More research, and more careful scrutiny of existing research
is needed in this area.
A large body of research has linked religion to prejudice
(Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Dittes, 1971; Simpson & Yinger,
1971) . (Whether prejudice can be considered a sign of poor
adjustinent is perhaps debatable. This author will show his
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liberal bias and assume that it is.) However, a more recent
review by Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974) has revealed that the
relationship is not so simple, m studies v^ere subjects
have been divided into intrinsically and extrinsically religious,
the intrinsics have consistently been found to be less prejudiced
than average, while the extrinsics are consistently more
prejudiced. This suggests that those v*io are personally committed
to their faith have genuinely internalized its humanitarian
ideals, while those who go to church for material advantages
or simply as part of an identification with "the American
way of life" are likely to adopt the American way of prejudice
as well. Consistent with these findings, several studies
found a curvilinear relationship between prejudice and church
attendance. Those v*io were least prejudiced either never
attended church or went more than once a week. The "Sunday
morning" Christians were found to be the most prejudiced.
This pattern of findings was not replicated for fundamentalists,
viio were found to be more prejudiced than others, regardless
of intrinsic-extrinsic orientation and degree of participation.
Unfortunately, Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974) do not report if
any of these studies controlled for education V(diich correlates
negatively with both prejudice and fundamentalism (Argyle
& Beit-Hal lahmi, 1975; Simpson & Yinger, 1971).
In contrast, research has shown religion to be a psychological
asset in a number of different respects. However, there are
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questions concerning the interpretation of these results as
well. One problem is that simplistic measures of religiosity
are often employed. Sociologists of religion have devoted
a great deal of attention to the simple question of how does
one measure religion? (Yinger, 1970). Clock and Stark (1965),
for example, have divided religiosity into five dimensions:
belief, practice, experience, knowledge, and consequences.
Sometimes research employing different dimensions as their
measure of religiosity will obtain different results. For
example, church attendance (participation dimension) has been
found to correlate negatively with mental illness, physical
illness, suicide, criminal behavior and alcoholism (Argyle
& Beit-Hal lahmi, 1975). However, juvenile delinquents, alcoholics
and patients v*io have attempted suicide do not differ from
others in their religious beliefs (Argyle & Beit-Hal lahmi,
1975)
.
It may be that religious faith is not enough to gain
the mental health benefits of religion. Participation in
the religious community, v^ich provides support and structure
for the individual, may also be an essential element. On
the other hand, one could argue that as people deteriorate
psychologically they drop out of organized social activities
like church. As the data is correlational, questions of causation
cannot be determined.
A second line of research shows that the religious are
more likely to report being personally happy (Ellison & Paloutzian,
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1979), and satisfied with their marriages (Argyle & Beit-Hal lahmi,
1975; Chesser, 1956; Dyer, 1961; Landis & Landis, 1953).
The latter finding, in particular, has been replicated numerous
times. "In all the studies in which religious variables have
been included, the more religious people have claimed to be
more happily married. The differences are not large, but
they are consistent" (Argyle & Beit-Hal lahmi, 1975, pg.
Such results are consistent with religion's claim to meet
man's highest needs and its emphasis on positive family life.
However, these results, too, must be interpreted with caution.
In light of the finding that the religious tend to "fake good"
or be more defensive on MMPI L and K scales, they might be
likely to paint an unrealistically rosy picture on self-report
scales concerning personal and marital happiness also. One
is often encouraged to think and talk positive in religious
circles. In addition, cognitive dissonance might cause many
religious to overestimate their marital happiness as religious
doctrine sometimes makes divorce difficult or impossible.
(A religionist could respond to this argument by saying that
"learning" to be happy with one's spouse may often be preferable
to breaking up families. Thus, the questions may be irresolvable
on the empirical level.)
It is clear that the conclusions one can draw from this
data are far from definitive. The pro-religious reader could
conclude that, excepting the results obtained with a series
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of biased personality tests, the religious came out ahead
on all the objective "real-^rld" criteria (e.g., physical
illness, suicide, etc.). The anti-religious reader, on the
other hand, could concede that the religious gain some minor
benefits from leading "straight" and "v^olesome" lives, but
argue that they pay for those benefits through severe self-imposed
limitations on their emotional and psychological functioning.
The truth may indeed be somewhere in-between. The structure
provided by religion may be a double edged sword which provides
support, endurance and security, but also limitations and
sometimes rigidity. The humanist may be more creative, but
he is also more likely to divorce, go insane, or commit suicide.
Who is to say which is better? This is a question to be answered
on the bases of values, not scientific inquiry.
One final way in v*iich one may examine the data is to
admit that the question, "Is religion (traditional or not)
good for your mental health?" is the wrong question. We might
do better to try to differentiate ways of being religious
(traditionally or nontraditionally) v*iich are healthy from
those v^ich are not. For example, the Gorsuch and Aleshire
(1974) article cited earlier showed that intrinsic and extrinsic
religiosity have opposite relationships to prejudice. Though
Gartner (1983) in his review found no relationship iDetween
self-esteem and religiosity, he did find a consistent positive
relationship between loving God images, as contrasted to judgmental
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ones, and self-esteem. Psychologists may indeed be right
that the quality of one's mental health is related to one's
religious beliefs. Perhaps the field has spent too much time
trying to damn or vindicate religion as a v^ole to fully explore
v*iat these relationships might be.
In summary, research has failed to find any consistent
relationship between religion and mental health. Thus, in
undertaking an analogue study on religion and clinical judgment,
one does not need to be concerned that clinicians will utilize
empirically valid norms as a factor in their decisions, for
clear norms relevant to this question have yet to be found.
CHAPTER II
OVERALL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
Overall Design
Doctoral level clinicians were asked to read two patient
case histories. (These two cases were pre-judged by raters
to be similar.) In one of these cases, the patient was described
as holding an extreme ideological orientation, while in the
other they were not. Four orientations were systematically
varied between the two cases: conservative religious, conservative
political, liberal religious, liberal political, in a sense,
the other three ideological groups serve as controls for the
extreme conservative religious patient. They allow us to
examine separately the impact of a patient's holding to a
belief system which is a) extreme, b) conservative or liberal,
or c) religious or political. Subjects also filled out a
brief questionnaire about their own demographic background
and ideological position.
Hypotheses
This study raises three basic questions, each with a
corresponding hypothesis or set of hypotheses.
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Question 1
Are patients viewed more negatively if they hold an extreme
ideological orientation?
Hypothesis lA. Patients holding an extreme ideological
position will be rated more negatively than patients who do
not hold such an orientation.
Hypothesis IB. Ideological patients will be assigned
more severe diagnoses. Specifically, they will more often
be assigned a) DSM-III axis II diagnoses (American Psychiatric
Association, 1980)
,
and b) the diagnoses of obsessive compulsive
or compulsive personality disorder (recall Freud believed
religion to be an obsessive compulsive neurosis)
.
Question 2
Will clinicians differentiate between the four groups
in their ratings? Three degrees of freedom allow for three
planned contrasts.
Hypothesis 2A . "Liberal vs. conservative" patients.
Given that most psychologists are liberals, the conservative
groups will be rated more negatively than the liberal groups.
Hypothesis 2B . "Religious vs. political" patients.
Given the long anti-religious tradition in psychology, religious
patients will be viewed more negatively than political ones.
Hypothesis 2C . "Conservative religious vs. the other"
patients. For both of the above reasons, the conservative
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religious group will be rated the nost negatively of all.
Question 3
Will the demographic and ideological traits of the rater
interact with the ideology of the patient in its effect on
the rater's responses?
Hypothesis 3A. Politically liberal clinicians will rate
conservative patients more negatively than they will rate
liberal patients. Conservative clinicians will react in the
opposite way.
Hypothesis 3B. Religiously liberal clinicians will rate
conservative patients more negatively than liberal patients.
Traditionally religious clinicians will react in the opposite
way.
Hypothesis 3C
. Clinicians v^o themselves indicate an
extreme position on the political or religious ideology scales
will evidence the above effects more strongly than will moderates.
Hypothesis 3D
. Northeasterners , and possibly Californians,
who as groups tend to be more liberal, will react more negatively
to the conservative patients than will the rest of the country.
Hypothesis 3E . Consistent with past findings (Gartner,
1982) , Jews will react more negatively to the conservative
religious patient (a fundamentalist Christian) and possibly
to conservative groups in general, than Gentiles.
Hypothesis 3F . Inasmuch as psychoanalytically oriented
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clinicians are more prone to infer pathology from behavior
which may not be overtly symptomatic than are behaviorists
,
psychoanalytic clinicians will react more negatively to the
ideological patients.
Hypothesis 3G. Inasmuch as women are more religious
than men as a group, women will react less negatively to the
conservative religious patient than men.
Hypothesis 3H
.
Given the negative attitude most conservative
groups have long held towards homosexuality, homosexual clinicians
will react more negatively to conservative patients and more
positively toward the liberals than heterosexuals.
In addition to the above hypotheses, the influence of
therapist race, age and social class of origin will be explored.
CHAPTER III
METHOD
Sample
The primary sample for this study was a group of clinical
psychologists whose names were obtained from the National
Register of Mental Health Service Providers . Eighteen hundred
randomly chosen names were sent the study by mail, in an
effort to recruit a traditionally religious subsample an additional
340 questionnaires were sent to a group of clinicians listed
in the Directory of the Christian Association for Psychological
Studies. CAPS is a professional organization for Evangelical
Christian psychologists. (Ideally, to insure that this group
was comparable, only those names which appeared in both the
CAPS Directory and the National Register would have been included
in this subsample. Hov^ever, due to the small number of CAPS
members, all doctoral level clinicians v^ose credentials were
those of the traditional mental health professional (e.g.,
Ph.D., Ed.D., M.D.) were included.
Materials
The Case Reports
Two case histories v^re needed for this study. Care
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was taken in choosing these cases to insure a) that no bias
on the part of the experimenter influenced their selection,
and b) that they were reasonably comparable in the ratings
they would receive on the dependent variable. A three-step
procedure was followed in an effort to achieve this aim.
All potential cases were chosen from the records of the
Psychological Services Center of the University of Massachusetts.
All initial psychotherapy summaries \^ich concerned adults,
followed the standard format and did not exceed two single
spaced pages in length were included for consideration after
identifying data was removed or changed.
This unwieldy pool of 117 cases was reduced to a more
manageable group of finalists by having 12 graduate students
in clinical psychology each rate 10 cases on the clinical
judgment scale (CJS) used in the study, as well as indicate
how well written each case was on a 7-point scale. All cases
v^ich were within 2/3 of a standard deviation of the mean
and rated as well written were included in the final pool.
At the third and final stage three advanced doctoral
students in clinical psychology rated the remaining 21 cases
on the CJS. They achieved an overall reliability score of
.72 on three test cases before rating the final 21, and .65
on the final 21. While this is not exceedingly high, it should
be noted that it was decided that the raters would not be
trained before making their ratings, v»*iich most likely contributed
41
toward keeping the reliability score low. The reason for
this was that it was believed that three clinicians each reflecting
their own notion of health and sickness would better represent
the diverse population of psychologists than raters trained
to respond in accordance with a particular model.
The two final cases to be used in the study were to be
those two a) whose mean ratings on the CJS were closest, and
b) who were reliably rated at the .8 level or better by the
three raters.
The two cases chosen (see Appendix A) were Mr. S, a
28-year-old black male graduate student from the Virgin Islands
v^o reports a history of stammering, social anxiety and
perfectionistic tendencies, and Mr. W, a 27~year-old white
male college student who presents a history of unstable
relationships, depression and familial conflict.
The Experimental Manipulation
The ideological groups used . It was necessary to pick
four specific groups to represent the conservative religious,
conservative political, liberal religious and liberal political
conditions specified in the design. Unfortunately, we were
able to think of no objective way to find four "equally extreme"
groups, since the designation of extremism usually reflects
the ideological position of the rater to some degree. Therefore,
the task was left to the judgment of the experimenter. The
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following choices were made:
conservative Religious (CR) : "Born Again" Fundamentalist
Christian;
Conservative Political (CP) : John Birch Society;
Liberal Religious (LR)
: Atheist International?
Liberal Political (LP) : American Socialist Party.
The insertion of ideology into the case history
. The
reader will recall that each subject rated one non-ideological
patient and one ideological patient. Mention of the patient's
ideology was inserted at four points in the case history.
In the first section, "identification of the patient," two
sentences were added at the end: "Further, the client makes
note of the fact that he is 'extremely conservative religiously
(CR)
,
conservative politically (CP)
, anti-religious (LR)
,
radical politically (LP) . ' Currently he is a member of
(organization name)." In the "presenting problems" section
the sentence was added, "At times Mr. S/W describes these
problems in the language of his ideological system, which
he says plays a central role in how he conceptualizes himself
and his world." In the middle of tlie report in the last sentence
of "current life situation" the sentence "Mr. S/W also spends
a lot of his time in religious/political activities" was added.
To control for the perceived effect of mere involvement in
group activities the sentence, "Mr. S/W also participates
regularly in the events of several local community organizations"
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was placed in the corresponding section of the non-ideological
patients' histories. Finally, at the end of the report in
the "diagnostic hypotheses" section, the sentence was added
"Further assessment should reveal v^at role, if any, Mr. S/W's
ideological beliefs play in his pathology or adjustinent."
The Dependent Variables
The clinical judgment scale used in this study (see Appendix
B) was a modified form of that introduced by Wallach and Strupp
(1966)
.
Though not used extensively, this scale had a more '
comprehensive set of questions (21 items) than most.
Unfortunately, the tradition in this area of research has
been to write a new, usually very brief, scale for each study.
No standard well validated instrument has emerged. Four dated
questions were dropped from the CJS and the response scales
were changed from 5 to 7 points, leaving 16 closed ended items
and one open ended (diagnosis) . Again, it was predicted in
hypotheses 1 and 2 that ideological patients, particularly
those vho were conservative, religious, or both, would be
rated more negatively on this scale than non-ideological patients.
Demographic and Ideology Questionnaire
Subjects filled out a second questionnaire (see Appendix
C) designed by the experimenter in v\^ich they indicated basic
demographic facts about themselves (e.g., sex, age, race,
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religion, family of origin religion, geographic region now
residing, geographic region of origin, social class of origin,
sexual orientation) as well as their ideological position
with respect to psychology, politics and religion. To reduce
the possibility that examining this questionnaire might alert
subjects to the purpose of the study and thereby influence
their responses on the CJS, the demographic questionnaire
was stapled shut and stamped with the message "Please do not
open until case ratings are completed." Of course, our third
set of hypotheses relate to the influence of these factors
on subjects' CJS ratings.
Procedure
Instructions to Subjects
In the attached cover letter subjects were told how we
got their names, and asked for their participation in the
"psychotherapy research project at the University of
Massachusetts." They were told that the purpose of the study
was to understand how "therapists respond to and evaluate
clinical material." They were asked to rate both cases on
the CJS and then fill out the demographic questionnaire.
At the bottom, a brief handwritten note thanked them for their
participation.
Subjects were also told that they, of course, did not
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have to participate, their responses would be confidential,
and that they indicated their willingness to participate by
mailing back the questionnaire. A brief summary of the results
could be obtained by mailing a stamped self-addressed envelope.
What Was Done
Two thousand one hundred forty sets of cover letters,
cases, questionnaires and business reply envelopes were mailed
to prospective subjects. An equal number of each case X ideology
combinations (10 in all) were randomly distributed to the
prospective subjects.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The Sample
'Three hundred sixty-three (18%) of the potential respondents
returned usable data. A summary of the distribution of demographic
and ideological characteristics of the sample can be found
in Table 1.
Not surprisingly, the sample is composed predominantly
of v^ite male heterosexuals (see Table 1) . The largest number
(40%) originally hail from the Northeast, though with respect
to their current residence, they are evenly distributed across
the nation's four regions. Just over 50% come from a working
class background, with the next largest group (32%) coming
from an upper middle class family. The median age is 45.
As a group, the sample is predominantly liberal in political
and religious orientation. At least in matters of religion
there is a tendency to be less traditional than their parents.
Twenty-five percent claim no religion, vy*iile only 2% were
raised without it. Forty-four percent were bom Protestant,
25% Jewish, and 18% Catholic. The most popular psychological
orientation is psychoanalytic (39%) followed by behavioral
(25%) and humanistic/existential (15%)
.
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TABLE 1
Demographic and Ideological Traits of the .q^mplo
Variable
Sex Male, 82% Female, 18%
Age 30-45, 50% 45-80, 50%
Race White, 96% Black . 1 Rft utner, 2%
Religion Prot, 33%
None, 25%
Cath, 11%
Other, 9%
Jew, 22%
Family relig Prot, 44%
None, 2%
Cath, 18%
Other, 6%
Jew, 25%
Geog location Northeast, 24%
West, 28%
South, 26% Midwest, 21%
GeocT oriain iNv-'JL L-liCdo L / Tu ^
West, 14%
bouth, 1/% Midwest, 28%
Psych orien Analytic, 39%
Other, 20%
Behav, 25% Hurnan/exis, 15%
Polit belief Str lib, 14%
Str con, 2%
Mod lib, 50%
None, 3%
Mod con, 27%
Other, 4%
Relig belief Ath, 9%
Mod lib, 24%
Ag, 22%
Mod trad, 17%
Str lib, 17%
Str trad, 6%
Class orig Low, 7%
Upper, 10%
Working, 51% Upper mid, 32%
Sexual pref Hetero, 93% Bi-homo, 6.5%
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Factor Analysis on the CJS
AS mentioned earlier, a 17-item Clinical Judgment Scale
(CJS) first introduced by Wallach and Strupp (I960) was used
in this study as the dependent variable. Factor analysis
employing an oblique rotation on the CJS revealed that it
could be divided into four distinct factors. Each item is
reported to be on the factor it loaded the most highly with.
Factor 1
This factor, v^ich explains 54% of the variance, can
best be described as measuring the extent to v^ich the therapist
"likes the patient," and feels able to work with him effectively.
It contains items 14-17:
14) Assuming that your recommendations for treatment
were followed, how would you rate the prognosis for this patient?
(Factor loading = .57)
.
15) How would you rate your willingness to accept this
patient for treatment? (Factor loading = .77).
16) Do you find it easy or difficult to empathize with
this patient? (Factor loading = .84).
17) How would you characterize your personal reaction
to this patient? (Factor loading = .77).
That this one factor explained the majority of the variance
is consistent with Wallach and Strupp' s (1966) finding that
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item 17 alone, personal reaction to the patient, was the best
predictor of the overall CJS score.
Factor 2
This factor, explaining 25% of the variance, can best
be described as nieasuring clinicians' estimates of patient
"pathology" and corresponding need for treatment, it contains
items 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13:
8) Considering the entire range of mental disorder,
how would you characterize the degree of disturbance in this
patient? (Factor loading =
.33).
10) If this patient were accepted for psychotherapy,
how would you rate the chances of his acting out? (Factor
loading =
.47)
.
11) How extensive a change in the patient's character
structure would you attempt? (Factor loading =
.60).
12) Assuming the patient did not terminate prematurely,
about how long would you expect to see this patient? (Factor
loading =
.57)
.
13) Assuming no treatment were undertaken, how would
you rate the prognosis for this patient? (Factor loading
=
.55).
Factor 3
This factor, explaining 10% of the variance, appears
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to measure the amount of internal and external "stress" the
clinician believes the patient is experiencing, it is composed
of items 1 and 2.
1) How much anxiety does this patient seem to have?
(Factor loading =
.61).
2) How much environmental stress does this patient have
to contend with? (Factor loading =
.47).
Factor 4
This last factor, explaining 9% of the variance, seems
to measure the degree of "psychological maturity," positive
mental health or self-actualization the clinician believes
the patient has attained. It contains items 3-7:
3) How much insight do you think this patient has into
his problems? (Factor loading = .48).
4) How much motivation for therapy does this patient
have? (Factor loading = .47).
5) How would you rate this patient's overall emotional
maturity? (Factor loading = .73).
6) How would you characterize this patient's social
adjustment? (Factor loading = .64).
7) How much "ego strength" does this patient seem to
have? (Factor loading = .48)
.
51
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis lA
.
Patients described as holding an extreme
ideological orientation will be rated more negatively than
those v^o do not.
Using multivariate analysis of variance for repeated
measures,! hypothesis lA was confirmed on all four factors
(see Tables 2 and 3)
.
The ideological patients were rated
more negatively than the non-ideological patients. Sguared
Pearson correlations between the ideology/no ideology condition
and the significant dependent variables reveal that the ideology
factor explains only between 1% and 2% of the variance.
Hypothesis IB
. Ideological patients will be assigned
more severe diagnoses. Specifically, a) they will receive
more axis II diagnoses and b) they will more often be diagnosed
obsessive compulsive or compulsive personality disorder.
The ideological groups were not more often assigned axis
II diagnoses. However, using chi square, it was found that
the ideological patients were assigned the diagnosis of obsessive
compulsive disorder almost three tiroes as often as the
non-ideological patients (see Figure 1) (7^2 = ig., df = 4,
£ _< .001) . In contrast, the non-ideological patients were
more often assigned the more mild generalized anxiety disorder
^Unless otherwise specified, all effects are tested by means
of multivariate analyses of variance for repeated measures,
and involve a main effect on interaction with "condition,"
the difference in the ratings assigned to ideological and
non-ideological patients.
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TABLE 2
Effect of Patient Ideology on Factors 1-4
Multivariate
Factor
Like patient (1) 3.23 4, 323 < .01
Pathology (2) 3.01 5, 315
_< .05
Stress (3) 4.94 2, 336 < .01
Maturity (4) 2.54 5, 323 < .01
TABLE 3
Effect of Patient Ideology on Individual Items
Factor Item F df p r^
1 Prognosis w trtmt 3.99 1, 326 < .05 .01
1 Accept for trtmt 7.12 1. 326 < .01 .01
1 Empathy for 12.17 1, 326 < .001 .02
1 Personal react 6.24 1, 326 < .01 .015
2
.
Length of trtmt 5.13 1, 319 < .05 .005
3 Anxiety 4.94 1, 336
_< .01 .01
4 Maturity 9.20 1, 327 < .01 .015
4 Social adj 9.43 1, 327 < .01 .015
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Figure 1. Ideological and non-ideological patients compared
on percent of obsessive compulsive and generalized anxiety
disorder
diagnoses received.
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diagnosis, it is worth noting that the obsessive compulsive
diagnosis is very evenly distributed ainong the four ideological
groups. No significant differences were found between the
groups in the diagnoses received.
It should be noted that this finding, in particular,
is specific to Mr. S v^o, overall, was diagnosed obsessive
compulsive 20% of the time. Mr. W received that diagnosis
only 2% of the time. When analyzed separately, the difference
in diagnostic assignment is significant for Mr. S (X.2 = 17.2,
df = 4, £ < .01) but not Mr. W. Inasmuch as Mr. S evidences
some symptoms consistent with the obsessive compulsive diagnosis,
but Mr. W does not, this is not surprising.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2A
. Subjects will rate conservative patients
more negatively than liberal patients.
Hypothesis 2A was not confirmed.
Hypothesis 2B . Religious patients will be rated more
negatively than political patients.
Hypothesis 2B was not confirmed.
Hypothesis 2C . The conservative religious patients will
be rated more negatively than the other patients.
In fact, exactly the opposite was found. Planned comparisons
revealed that subjects "liked" the conservative religious
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patient better than the other three (see Figure 2)2 (nultivariate
F = 2.79, df = 4, 323, p < .05) . These results were found
on all four of the items of the "like the patient" factor:
"patient prognosis with treatment" (F = 7.72, df = 1, 326,
£< .01); "desire to treat patient" (F = 6.07, df = 1, 326,
£ < .01); "empathy for patient" (F = 7.35, df = 1, 326, £
< .01); and "personal reaction to patient" (F = 6.76, df =
1, 326, £ < .01) . Similar trends were noted on the "stress"
(£ = .08) and "maturity" (£ = .12) factors.
These findings raise the question, "is the conservative
religious patient, when analyzed alone, rated more negatively
than the non-ideological patient? in fact, he is not different
than the non-ideological patient on any of the four factors.
Thus, the only dimension on vAiich the conservative religious
patient differs from the non-ideological patient is diagnosis
(see Hypothesis IB section)
.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3A
. Liberal clinicians will rate conservative
patients more negatively than liberal patients. Conservative
clinicians will do the opposite.
This hypothesis was confirmed (see Figures 3 and 4) on
^In the interest of brevity, only the most significant item
of a significant factor will be graphed, with the exception
of hypothesis 3A, which was particularly complex. The dependent
variable depicted is always the difference in ratings assigned
the ideological and non-ideological patients.
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Figure 2. Therapists compared on empathy for conservative
religious patients vs. other ideological patients.
consv. consv. libtral liberal
religious political religious political
patient patient patient patient
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Figure 3. Liberal and conservative therapists compared
on empathy for liberal and conservative patients.
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Figure 4. Liberal and conservative therapists compared
on personal reaction to liberal and conservative patients.
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the "like the patient" factor when the patients were combined
into conservative and liberal groups (therapist ideology X
patient ideology X experimental condition interaction3
(multivariate F = 4.31, df = 4, 274, p < .01) and v*ien all
four patient ideological groups were analyzed separately
(multivariate F = 2.14, df = 12, 273, £ < .05) . When the
patients were combined into two groups, significant differences
were found on items measuring therapist "empathy for patient"
(F = 8.74, df = 1, 279, p < .005) and therapist's "personal
reaction" to the patient (F = 7.61, df = 1, 297, p < .01)
.
When the four patient ideological groups were analyzed separately,
significant differences were once again found on "empathy
for the patient" (F = 7.76, df = 1, 297, p < .01) and therapist's
"personal reaction" to the patient (F = 5.58, df = 1, 297,
£ < .01)
.
A parallel finding on the "stress" scale barely missed
achieving significance (p = .06).
Figures 3 and 4 raise two important questions. Both
are best answered by examining the results of this same 3-way
interaction v\hen the four ideological groups of patients were
analyzed separately (see Figures 5 and 6)
.
1) Visually, it is undeniable that conservative therapists
rate liberal patients more negatively than conservative patients.
^All subsequent effects are 3-way interactions unless otherwise
specified.
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Figure 5. Liberal and conservative therapists compared
on empathy for CR, CP, LR and LP patients.
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Figure 6. Liberal and conservative therapists compared
on personal reaction to CR, CP, LR and LP patients.
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Are liberals also biased? On Figure 3, they appear to rate
conservative groups more negatively than liberal patients,
but is this difference significant?
On balance, the answer appears to be yes. Newman-Keuls
post-hoc comparisons find that liberal therapists do not rate
the conservative religious patient more negatively than
conservative therapists do. However, as we have already seen,
this ideological group of patients is unique with respect
to the other three. By and large, the sample as a v^ole is
not biased against the conservative religious patients. By
contrast, in the case of the conservative political patients,
liberal therapists rate them more negatively than conservative
therapists on both the "empathy" and "personal reaction" items.
2) Do conservative clinicians claim to dislike liberal
patients more than liberal clinicians dislike conservative
patients? Newman-Keuls comparisons were employed to answer
this question as well. Figures 3 and 4 would seem to state
that case rather dramatically. However, we must remember
that liberal therapists' ratings of the conservative religious
patient are averaged into the means depicted in those diagrams.
The fact that liberals also dislike the conservative political
patients less than conservative clinicians dislike both liberal
groups on the 'personal reaction" item (as well as to a
nonsignificant degree on the "empathy" item) is an even more
convincing confirmation of that hypothesis.
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Thus, overall, we can conclude that conservative therapists
express less tolerance for liberal patients than liberal clinicians
express for conservative patients, though both prefer patients
of their own persuasion.
An unexpected additional finding, overall liberal clinicians
rate all ideological patients as experiencing more stress
than do conservative clinicians (therapist ideology X condition
interaction: multivariate F = 6.21, df = 2, 287, p < .01).
Findings were significant for both "patient anxiety" (F =
6.24, df = 1, 288, p < .05) and "environmental stress" (F
= 7.64, df = 1, 288, £ < .01)
.
Hypothesis 3B
. Religious liberals and atheists will
rate conservative groups more negatively than liberal groups.
Traditionally religious clinicians will do the opposite.
Findings for this hypothesis are very similar to those
found for political ideology. The hypothesis was confirmed
for the "like the patient" factor (see Figure 7) (multivariate
F = 3.2, df = 4, 272, p _< .05). Significance was found on
the "empathy for the patient" item (F = 7.76, df = 1, 297,
2< .01) and "personal reaction" item (F = 5.58, df = 1, 297,
p < .01) . Further, if one examines Figure 7 and compares
it to Figure 3, the results for therapist religious ideology
are almost identical with those found for therapist political
ideology.
As one might expect, political and religious ideology
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Figure 7. Religiously liberal /non-religious and traditionally
religious therapists compared on empathy for liberal and conservative
patients
.
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are correlated (r =
.33, N = 329, p < .01) . When both are
included in a multiple regression equation, the effect of
religious ideology almost completely drops out, suggesting
that it is religious ideology's association with political
ideology or some unknown third variable v^ich explains its
effect on the dependent variable. The political match or
mismatch between patient and therapist accounts for 1.5% of
the variance on the "like the patient" factor.
Hypothesis 3C. Clinicians v^o hold extreme ideological
positions will rate patients with opposite beliefs more negatively
than will moderates.
When therapists v^o were "strongly liberal" in political
matters were compared to "moderate liberals" significant
differences were found in the predicted direction on the maturity
factor (see Figure 8) (multivariate F = 2.69, df = 5, 92,
p _< .05). Individual items measuring therapists' estimates
of "patient insight" (F = 3.93, df = 1, 196, p < .05), "social
adjustment" (F = 4.58, df = 1, 196, p < .01), and "ego strength"
(F = 6.89, df = 1, 196, p < .01) were significant.
A parallel finding on the maturity scale barely missed
significance (p = .052) when therapists were divided into
religious liberals vs. atheists and agnostics. Trends were
found on the "like the patient" scale for both political (p
=
.08) and religious ideology (£ = .12).
Unfortunately, there were so few extreme conservatives
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Figure 8. Extreme and moderate liberal therapists compared
on estimates of patient ego strength for liberal and conservative
patients
.
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in the sample that extreme and moderate conservatives could
not be compared.
Hypothesis 3D
,
Clinicians from the Northeast, and possibly
the West Coast, will react nx^re negatively to conservative
patients than will the rest of the country.
When Northeasterners were compared to the rest of the
country (including the West Coast)
, the hypothesis was supported
on the "maturity" factor (see Figure 9) (multivariate F =
2.45, df = 5, 317, £ < .05) . The only significant item was
therapists' estimate of how much insight the patient had (F
4.22, df = 1, 321, £ < .05) , with trends on motivation for
therapy and social adjustment.
It is unlikely that this effect is an artifact of political
orientation. Geographic location and political orientation
do show a small correlation (.14). However, v*ien both are
introduced into a hierarchical multiple regression equation,
geographic location explains the most variance (2%) on the
"maturity" factor.
Moreover, this effect appears to also be independent
of the strong vs. moderate liberal effect. Strong liberals,
who were found to differ from moderate liberals on this factor,
are not more likely to live in the Northeast.
Finally, one need not be concerned that the geography
finding may be an artifact of the fact that CAPS therapists,
viho tend to be conservative, live predominantly outside of
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Figure 9. Northeastern and other therapists conpared on
estimates of patient insight for liberal and conservative patients.
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the Northeast (see pg. 83) . When the CAPS therapists are
removed from the analysis, the same results are obtained
(multivariate F = 2.55, df = 5, 281, p < .05).
Hypothesis 3E. Jews will rate conservative patients
more negatively and liberal patients more positively than
Gentiles, in particular, Jews and Gentiles may appear different
on the conservative religious patient.
This hypothesis was not confirmed. Unexpectedly, Jews
were found to react less adversely overall to the ideological
groups than Gentiles on the "like the patient" factor (therapist
religion X condition interaction: multivariate F = 3.44,
df = 4, 288, £ < .01) . None of the individual items achieved
significance, though "personal reaction" almost did (p = .055).
A similar trend v^ich barely missed significance (p = .056)
was found on the "maturity" factor.
Hypothesis 3F
. Psychoanalysts will react more negatively
to the ideological patients than will behaviorists
.
Hypothesis 3F was not confirmed.
Hypothesis 3G . Women will react more favorably to the
conservative religious patients than men.
Hypothesis 3G was not confirmed.
Hypothesis 3H . Homosexual clinicians will react more
negatively to conservative patients and more positively to
liberal patients than will heterosexual clinicians.
On the "stress" factor a trend in the predicted direction
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was found (p = .079). i^e "patient anxiety" ite. was significant
(F
= 5.09, df = 1, 326, p = .02) and the "environmental stress"
item was not significant. The two-way therapist sexual preference
X patient ideology interaction, however, was significant
(r^ltivariate F = 3.38, df = 2, 325, p < .05) (see Figure
10).
Exploratory Questions
No relationship was found between the age or social class
of origin of the clinicians and their responses. There were
too few minorities in the sample to assess the impact of race.
Mr. S Compared to Mr. W
The effort to find two perfectly matched cases was less
than completely successful. Overall, ^4r. S, the black graduate
student presenting problems of stuttering, social anxiety
and perfectionism, was seen more positively than was the v*iite
college student presenting unstable relationships, depression
and familial conflict (F = 12.2, df = 4, 673, £ < .001).
Hotelling's T^ reveals that Mr. S scores more positively on
the "like the patient" factor (F = 12, df = 4, 673, £ < .001)
and the "pathology" factor (F = 47.9, df = 5, 663, p < .001).
However, Mr. S is seen as experiencing significantly more
internal and external stress (F = 56, df = 2, 689, £ _< .001).
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Figure 10. Hcxnosexual/bisexual and heterosexual therapists
compared on estimates of patient anxiety for liberal and conservative
patients
.
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on the "naturity" factor, Mr. s and Mr. w split, with Mr. s
being seen as less insightful (t = 3.71, df = 676, p < .001)
and having a less satisfactory social adjustinent (t = 2.54,
df
= 676, £ < .01) , v^iie Mr. W is seen as less mature (t
= 6.81, df = 676, p < .001) and lower in ego strength (t =
6.96, df = 676, 2 < .001).
Ihe discovery of these differences between the two case
histories raises at least three potential problems relevant
to other analyses:
1) If Mr. S and Mr. W are not evenly distributed among
the ideological and nonideological cases, results could be
an artifact of the Mr. S/Mr. W distribution. Fortunately,
this is not a problem. Mr. S and Mr. W are very evenly distributed
(e.g.
,
51% of the ideological cases are Mr. S and 49% Mr. W)
.
2) The differences between Mr. S and Mr. W will increase
the error term making it more difficult to achieve significance
and lowering the percentage of variance accounted for by the
experimental manipulation, in fact, the effect sizes in this
study are small, and this may be one contributing factor.
3) If Mr. S and Mr. W are different, it may be that
the experimental manipulation does not influence the ratings
given to both of them. When analyzed alone, the ideological
patients are rated significantly more negatively than the
nonideological patient for Mr. S (F = 1.9, df = 16, 306, £
_< .05) but not for Mr. W. However, though they fail to achieve
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Significance, each of the 16 items is in the expected direction
and item 5, patient maturity, is significant (t = 2.91, df
= 333, p < .01)
.
Therefore, though it is clear that the effect
is stronger for one patient, the fact that both consistently
achieve results in the same direction seems an adequate basis
for combining them in subsequent analyses, though caution
will need to be applied when discussing the generalizability
of these findings.
CAPS and National Register Therapists Compared
Before combining the CAPS and National Register samples,
they were compared for possible differences. As one might
expect, Chi square reveals that CAPS therapists are much more
likely to be Protestant ( = 53, df = 4, p < .0001) , from
a Protestant background 1:^2 = 48, df = 4, p < .0001), religiously
traditional
= 112, df = 6, £ < .0001) , and politically
conservative (;*^2 = 53^ ^f = 6, p < .0001). CAPS clinicians
were also more likely to live in the West or Midwest and less
likely to live in the Northeast than National Register
psychologists (;t.2 = 10.9, df = 4, p < .05) . They were less
likely to originate from the Northeast as well (;t.2 = 4,3,
df = 1, £ < .05)
.
When the four ideological patients are combined into
two groups, conservative patients and liberal patients, CAPS
84
therapists were found to rate conservative patients lower
on the stress factor than National Register therapists (see
Figure 11) (professional organization X patient ideology X
condition interaction: multivariate F = 3.88, df = 2, 342,
£ < .05)
.
This difference is almost exclusively explained
by the difference between CAPS and National Register therapists
on the "environmental stress" item (F = 7.27, df = 1, 343,
£ < .01)
.
Surprisingly, the CAPS clinicians rated all of the ideological
groups lower than the National Register sample on the "maturity-
factor (professional organization X condition interaction:
multivariate F = 4.08, df = 5, 329, p < .01) . The only significant
item on this factor was "patient maturity" (F = 12.85, df
= 1, 333, £ < .001)
.
No differences were found on the other factors or the
diagnoses assigned to patients.
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Figure 11. National Register and CAPS therapists compared
on estimates of patient environmental stress for liberal and
conservative patients.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Overview
Overall, strong support has been found for the notion
that patients holding an extreme ideological orientation are
perceived more negatively by clinicians than non-ideological
patients. Contrary to predictions, the conservative religious
patient was the exception rather than the preeminent example
of this effect. Finally, a number of demographic and ideological
factors, including therapists' political and religious ideology,
geographic location and sexual orientation were found to interact
with therapists' evaluations of ideological patients in both
predicted and unexpected ways.
Extreme Ideological Orientations and Clinical Judgment
The extreme ideological patients were seen as more disturbed,
immature, under greater stress, and were less liked than the
non-ideological patients. They were also more likely to be
diagnosed obsessive-compulsive
.
Are these findings evidence of prejudice? This is a
complex question about v^ich arguments could be made for either
side.
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or
If one wanted to argue the affirmtive position, he
she would simply need to point to this study's findings.
When all other factors are held constant, clinicians rate
a patient with an extreme ideological orientation more negatively
than a non-ideological patient on all four factors. On the
face of it this seems to be a clear indication of bias. Yet,
in fairness, a number of mitigating factors need be considered.
First, to put this finding in perspective, it should
be noted that the effect size was quite small, explaining
no more than 2% of the variance. This suggests that v^ile
the patient's ideological orientation influenced clinicians'
judgments, it was a relatively small influence. This is a
strong contrast to unabashedly negative ratings college students
give to these same groups (Gartner, in progress)
. Psychologists
indeed may distinguish themselves more by their tolerance
than their prejudice.
Furthermore, these results were strongest for one patient,
Mr. S, a black graduate student who manifested a number of
compulsive symptoms. Further research may show that particular
patient demographics and traits are more likely to elicit
a negative response to patient ideology, rather than it being
a simple "across the board bias." Further research is needed
to determine how generalizable these findings are. (It is
a matter of speculation as to vihat in Mr. S elicited a stronger
response. His race may make an extreme ideological position
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appear ^re unusual, or his expulsive symptc^s rray be nK.re
consistent with clinicians' negative expectations concerning
the psychological function of extrene ideological systems.)
Secondly, there is a rational basis for niaking negative
judgments about these groups. Sone research has found that
people with extreme right wing and extreme left wing views
are less well adjusted than the general population (Eysenck
& coulter, 1972; Kreml, 1977; Rokeach, 1960). in particular,
research has found such individuals to be more dogmatic.
Though there is not room for a full review here, dogmatism
has been correlated with just about everything under the sun
over the last twenty years, from cognitive rigidity (Rokeach,
1960) to paranoia (Eysenck & Coulter, 1972) , and the consensus
is that it is better not to be dogmatic.
The critic pressing for the prejudice theory would, of
course, seek to rebut these arguments. He or she would argue
that a "small bias" is still a bias, (in addition, we don't
really know how small the bias is since psychologists may
be trying to appear nonprejudiced. ) Further, the existence
of a rational or statistical basis for bias does not necessarily
justify it. For example, it is well known that women as a
group have been found to perform more poorly than men on
mathematical tests. (Conversely, men are worse on verbal
tests.) Would it be fair or reasonable for science oriented
graduate schools to rank female applicants lower than males
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on the basis of these statistical norms? Finally, it is
relevant to note that the strength of the relationships between
group inembership and most negative traits is rarely as strong
as people perceive them to be (Hamilton, 1981) . Patients
with extreme ideological orientations may not be as sick as
clinicians think.
The proponents of these two views could probably continue
their debate. However, we can end this section with a conclusion
they would both most likely agree on. Whether or not a negative
preliminary evaluation of an ideological patient is an expression
of prejudice, it certainly does not bode well for the future
therapeutic relationship.
In an important study, Hans Strupp (1958) showed therapists
a film of a clinical interview. At key moments the film was
stopped and the subject played the role of therapist. Strupp
found that:
Therapists who indicated a dislike for
the patient tended to choose more pejorative
diagnostic labels, such as psychopath,
paranoid or character disorder. They
also saw the patient as less insightful,
more immature, and having a poor prognosis.
They anticipated encountering certain
kinds of problems in treatment, such as
countertransference feelings of anger
or resentment. These therapists were
more inclined to be strict, active and
to suggest a briefer and more supportive
type of therapy which might iDe terminated
by unworkable countertransference reactions.
Their interventions were rated as colder
emd less empathic [three times as often] ....
[This study] clearly demonstrates that
a clinician's initial impressions and
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feelings about a patient can strongly
and adversely affect his clinical work.
(Singer & Luborsky, 1977, pg. 442-443)
Past research (Berzins, 1977; Beutler, 1972) has demonstrated
that a high degree of value discrepancy between patient and
therapist is a poor prognostic indicator for therapy. The
current findings suggest that the therapist's initial negative
reaction to patients v*io differ from them ideologically may
be an important factor in that effect.
The encouraging finding is that Strupp (1958) reports
that therapists who had themselves been analyzed were less
likely to be cold to patients they did not like, the implication
being that therapists who are more advanced, introspective
or conflict-free can overcome their personal reactions well
enough to provide quality services to the disliked patient.
If nothing else, the current study should alert us as clinicians
to the potential problem of ideological countertransference
,
and allow us to take appropriate steps to minimize its negative
impact on our clinical work.
Religious Prejudice in Psychology?
This study has not provided great support for the notion
that psychologists' clinical judgments are biased against
conservative religious patients. The Christian fundamentalist
patient was not rated more negatively than the non-ideological
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patient on any of the four factors. These results are consistent
with those reported by I^wis (1983) v^o, in a similar study,
found no bias against a depressed evangelical who used religious
language during an interview. In addition, the conservative
religious patient in this study was rated more positively
than the other three ideological groups.
It is unfortunate that there is no empirical research
on this problem before 1983. Though it is pure speculation,
I suspect the same results might not have been obtained twenty
or thirty years ago. Rather, this greater tolerance toward
religion may be a more recent development, the product of
at least three separate developments.
First, over the last twenty years, the field has become
increasingly sensitive to biases of all kinds among mental
health professionals (Abranowitz & Dokecki, 1974). Secondly,
there seems to have been a change specifically in the attitudes
of mental health professionals toward religion. While early
psychologists and psychiatrists expressed their negative views
toward religion with little apology or opposition (see Gartner,
1982) , a more recent trend toward a rapprochement between
psychology and religion has been noted by several authors
(Bergin, 1983; Pattison, 1969; Saffady, 1976). Parallel to
this change in psychologists' attitudes toward religion has
been a change in the character and general public perception
of conservative religious groups. Fundamentalists, with some
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justification, were often perceived as reactionary, rigid,
anti
-intellectual, legalistic, and separatistic
. However,
more recently, a new group, whom Quebedeaux (1974) has called
the "Young Evangelicals," has emerged. They are theologically
conservative, but as a group more educated, moderate and mainstream
in their beliefs and lifestyles. The prime example is former
president Jimmy Carter, who probably did the most to alert
the American public that not all Evangelicals fit the old
Fundamentalist stereotype.
Thus, a greater tolerance for religion as well as a greater
sophistication about the general problems of bias and the
diversity of religious people may have contributed to these
findings. Psychologists may choose to understand their individual
patient's religious faith in greater depth before pre-judging
it. These results should be encouraging to those religious
people v*io fear entering psychotherapy because they believe
therapists are hostile to religion (King, 1978)
.
This is not to suggest that a conservative religious
orientation has no influence on clinicians' perceptions of
clients. It was found that the conservative religious patient
was more likely to be given the diagnosis of obsessive compulsive,
in contrast to the non-ideological patient v*io was more likely
to be diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder. Obsessive compulsive
disorder is generally considered to be both more severe and
unusual than generalized anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric
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Association, 1980). Thus, it is difficult to explain v^y
the conservative religious patient was not rated more negatively
on the Clinical Judgment Scale, it is possible that subjects
inflated their ratings of the conservative religious patient
in an effort not to appear prejudiced (who could better decipher
the purpose of a psychological experiment than a psychologist?)
.
It is also possible that the patient's religion may influence
therapists' clinical judgments in a fashion vAiich is more
qualitative than quantitative. Rather than causing them to
see the patient as more disturbed, it changes the way in v^ich
they understand his disturbance. Freud (1913) argued 70 years
ago that religion is an obsessive conpulsive neurosis. Clinicians
appear to still be influenced by that view today. (It should,
however, also be noted that effect was almost exclusively
specific to one patient vi^o manifested some symptoms consistent
with the obsessive compulsive diagnosis. Thus, the mere religious
label alone is not sufficient to elicit the obsessive compulsive
diagnosis.) More research into qualitative differences in
how clinicians conceptualize cases involving religious patients
seems called for.
The next question is v^y were the other three ideological
groups perceived so much more negatively than the conservative
religious patient? While there may be more than one possible
explanation, the most plausible appears to be that the conservative
religious group is substantially more frequent in the American
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population. One in three Americans claims to be a Born-Again
Christian (Princeton Religious Research, 1982) whereas the
number of John Birch Society, Atheist International and Socialist
party members is likely to be no more than 1% of the population.
This probably represents an error in the experimental design,
though perhaps a serendipitous one. An effort was made to
balance the groups, at least subjectively, with respect to
extremism, but no attention was paid to statistical frequency.
Thus, ideological belief systems v^ich are both extreme
and rare may be the most likely to be perceived as deviant
by clinicians. In fact, one of the most commonly taught models
of psychological deviance is the statistical model (Kleinmuntz,
1980)
,
v^ich states the simple thesis that the unusual is
deviant. Little research has been done on the extent to which
the statistical model actually affects clinicians' day-to-day
clinical judgments.
Overall, these results suggest that the question of religious
prejudice in psychology is a complex one. The appropriate
question may not be "does religious bias exist?" but among
vy*iich psychologists, against which groups, under v^ich
circumstances? For instance, Gartner (1982) found that professors
of clinical psychology were less likely to admit a Born-Again
Christian into clinical psychology graduate school than an
identical non-ideological applicant. It may be that clinicians
are less tolerant of ideological diversity among potential
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colleagues than among patients. The statistical model of
deviance may help explain this finding as well. While one
out of five Americans, and therefore we can assume a substantial
number of patients, are traditionally religious (Princeton
Religious Research Center, 1982)
,
only one in 25 psychologists
is religiously traditional (Nix, 1978; this study). Thus,
religious therapists are statistically deviant while religious
patients are not. Further research into this "professional
bias" is planned by this author. In addition, there is as
of now little psychotherapy process research that examines
the religious variable. Indeed, it may be some time before
we have a complete picture of clinicians' attitudes toward
religion.
The Effect of Therapists' Demographic and Ideological Traits
Political Ideology
Both liberal and conservative clinicians were found to
like patients better v^ose ideologies were closer to their
own. Conservative therapists disliked liberal patients more
than conservative patients and liberal clinicians disliked
conservative patients (not including the conservative religious
patient) more than liberal patients. Further, this effect
appears stronger the more extreme the therapist's ideology
is, and therefore, the larger the ideological gulf between
97
therapist and patient.
Past research (Ehrlich, 1973) has shown that most people
like people who are ideologically consistent with themselves
better than other people v*io are not. In this sense, clinicians
are perhaps only demonstrating that they are human, it is
an important and happy finding that clinicians did not change
their judgments of patient pathology or maturity on the basis
of the ideological match between themselves and the patient,
though the effect on the stress factor failed to achieve
significance by only a narrow nergin.
Probably the most important conclusion we can draw from
these results is that many therapists should carefully consider
before seeing patients whose ideologies are sharply different
from their own. At the very least, clinicians should be sensitive
to the potential problem of ideological countertransference
.
This may be particularly important for therapists viho themselves
hold extreme beliefs. As was mentioned earlier, these findings
illuminate one key factor that may contribute to the lower
success rate therapists have with patients v^ose values differ
strongly from their own (Berzins, 1977; Beutler, 1972). Therapists
may begin liking such patients less from the beginning, making
the formation of an effective therapeutic alliance difficult.
Overall, conservative clinicians dislike liberal patients
more than liberal clinicians dislike conservative patients.
The most ready explanation is simply that conservatives may
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be more prejudiced than liberals, which is consistent with
past research (Simpson & Yinger, 1972) . However, this finding
may be best understood in the context of another one: liberals
see all ideological groups as being higher in stress than
do conservative therapists. These two findings may reflect
differences at the heart of liberal and conservative ideology.
In some ways it could be said that liberals believe more
in a process than a creed v^en compared to conservatives.
Stated simplistically, liberals seem to believe more in the
importance of letting the human mind and spirit develop unimpeded,
in the faith that that process will lead to knowledge and
human growth. For that reason, the American Civil Literties
Union is more concerned with preserving political freedom
(even for Nazis) than in proposing a particular political
platform, and some liberal psychologists are as concerned
about whether a patient's mind is open and flexible as they
are about its contents. In contrast, conservatives may be
more concerned with the preservation of a particular set of
ideas, essential truths (e.g., the central ity of the family),
v^ich are not necessarily viewed as appropriate subjects for
debate.
If the above analysis is correct, it is not surprising
that liberals overall view extreme ideological orientations
more negatively than conservatives. Such orientations limit
the experimentation and curiosity v^ich the liberal cherishes
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by demanding adherence to a particular viewpoint. The extreme
ideologue may be seen as experiencing more stress either because
his or her orientation is seen as a "cheap" solution to the
ambiguity of life and intolerable personal stress, or because
the orientation itself is seen as restrictive and therefore
stress inducing.
In contrast, the conservative appears to be more offended
by ideas v^ich differ from his or hers in content, v^ich would
be consistent with the conservative's concern for a particular
set of beliefs.
Religious Ideology
Findings for this variable were virtually identical to
those obtained for political ideology. Indeed, political
and religious ideology were correlated and explained the same
portion of variance. Political ideology appeared to explain
slightly more variance, causing it to nudge religious ideology
out of the multiple regression equation. While political
ideology seems a bit more salient, it appears that there may
be an overall liberal/conservative continuum, on v^ich therapists
can be divided, which incorporates both political and religious
ideology. If that were the case, we would expect to find
parallel results for both variables as we have indeed found.
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Geography
Northeastern clinicians perceive extreme conservative
patients to be more immature than extreme liberal patients,
v^ereas this is not true of therapists who live in other regions.
The statistical model of deviance may again be of use
here. Extreme conservatives are more infrequent in the Northeast.
For example, the Princeton Religious Research Center (1982)
found almost every other Southerner to be an Evangelical Christian,
but only one in 11 Northeastemers were found to hold such
beliefs. Thus, the statistical model would predict that
Northeastern clinicians would rate extreme conservative groups
more negatively. (Inasmuch as Northeastern conservatives
have chosen a belief system vdiich is more unusual to their
region, it is at least conceivable that research may find
them to be more disturbed than conservatives in the rest of
the country.)
These findings suggest that the anti-conservative
discrimination which this author expected to find in this
data may be peculiar to the Northeast. (Not coincidental ly,
many of the observations v^iich led the author to hypothesize
such a bias exists were based on the author's experience as
a Northeastern doctoral student in clinical psychology.)
Northeastern clinicians may need to take special care in attending
to the problem of anti-conservatism.
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CAPS Members
CAPS members perceive conservative patients as experiencing
less stress than liberal patients. iTiis may be indicative
of a general bias in favor of the conservative patients, which
is consistent with findings concerning religious ideology
reported earlier (indeed, CAPS members show results in the
appropriate direction on the "like the patient" factor)
.
Two qualifying observations are worth noting, however.
First, CAPS members do not rate liberal patients as experiencing
more stress than do therapists from the National Register.
They are expressing a positive bias in favor of the conservative
patients, but not a corresponding negative one toward the
liberals. Secondly, this effect is almost completely specific
to the item measuring environmental stress, which is very
unusual. That particular item was rarely significant in other
analyses. Though it is only a speculation, one wonders if
these traditionally religious therapists, familiar with the
close-knit communities that grow up around churches, are inferring
that patients who belong to such traditional organizations
have a stronger than average support system.
CAPS members also rated all the ideological groups as
more immature than did the rest of the sample. There may
be a hint here, as in the findings for therapist religious
ideology, of the link between religiosity and prejudice (Simpson
& Yinger, 1972) vAiich has been reported in the general population.
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It may also be that CAPS therapists, by virtue of their own
ideological commitinent, are more sensitive to subtle variations
in extreme ideological orientations. (Indeed, many of the
articles published in the journals v^ich publish articles
of concern to CAPS members focus on distinguishing between
"mture" and "immature" faith.) For instance, most CAPS therapists
would most likely notice that the conservative religious patient
was described as a "Fundamentalist." Within Christian circles,
the label "Fundamentalist" is often sharply contrasted to
the less reactionary "Evangelical" (Quebedeaux, 1974) , v^iereas
many outsiders might not know the difference.
More generally, these results may be another example
of therapists who themselves hold an extreme ideological
orientation, being more reactive than moderate therapists
to the ideological belief system of their patients. Such
therapists would be well advised to devote special attention
to their potentially negative reactions toward patients whose
ideologies differ from their own.
Sexual Orientation
Hantiosexual and bisexual clinicians perceive conservative
patients as experiencing more stress, particularly anxiety,
than liberal patients, and perceive conservative patients
as experiencing more stress than heterosexual clinicians do.
Conservative groups have long held negative (some would
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argue persecutory) attitudes toward homosexuality and homosexuals.
It is, thus, not surprising to find that homosexual clinicians
perceive conservative patients negatively. One wonders if
the homosexual clinicians are projecting some of their own
feelings about conservative groups onto their patients.
The conservative patient may make the homosexual clinician
anxious, or, putting himself in the patient's place, the homosexual
clinician may imagine that if he or she were a conservative,
or lived in a conservative subculture, it would be very personally
stressful
.
In any case, the same note of caution that has been sounded
to other groups concerning the danger of ideological
countertransference should be extended to homosexual clinicians
vjho may have extreme conservative patients.
Religion
Jews were found to be more tolerant than Gentiles of
ideological groups, an intriguing finding. Jews may be more
sensitive to intolerance, as a consequence of being victimized
by it. However, inasmuch as those victimizers were often
fueled by extreme ideologies, Jews' greater tolerance of such
people is surprising. These results are at variance with
previous findings (Gartner, 1982) v^ich showed Jews to react
more negatively than Gentiles to a Born-Again Christian applicant
to graduate school in clinical psychology. Clearly, more
research into this variable is called for.
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IMTAKE SUMMARY
Mr. S is a 28-year-old black b^Ii. n.degree in Conputer Science. Mr S w^n^ !
P"""tly toileting a Masters
the Virgin I.lands to attend g^.d^itficL^i'"?' " ^'^^l"**' ""e fron.With three other «le
.tudentf " " apartment
Preaenting Probleas
his
.Mlity'"';ea'^*ii^h o'tie'r iTrJ"' ^.V"' '""'^^y -th
.oxious anJ he ."«e s or ^^tCr He I?
'"''"^
«d precise, and to do thxngs Jast illV'^Vll"^''''' '° ^"""^1idle." worries about
.-all fhin« and if J'^* ""'^'^
Mental Status
Mr
and logical.
History of Referring Situation
.peec^theri;; "ihe^refe'r^nnS''''^" * ""'^ ""P"^'
olivine . K
indirectly suggested the possibility of anxiety
liruicf Jo" :e h llllir' ^''^ ''-"^''^^^^y psycLther^py a^ anadj n t to spe c therapy.
and o?''.lL!!^^''?! *
°^ stammering or stuttering since early childhood,f always talking very fast when "excited." He has always experienced som^distress approaching people verbally because the subtle reaction^^to hisco.»unicative style have been perceived by hi- as negative (i e ficiilexpressions of puzzle-ent or i-patience). '
Fa-ily Background
^' i8"'^*<» the Virgin Islands to the United States twoyears ago. His father, who was a co-q»ercial artist, now works as a cook in a
restaurant His
-other, A4, previously a housewife, now works as a -aid in
a nursing hoae. Mr. S perceives the fa-ily' s change in status as humiliating
and some relatives allegedly "rub it in." However, the family has been able toanage well enough to defray the cost of .chool support for the two sons, of
whom the client is the oldest. The younger brother is finishing a college degreeinis year. This younger brother is reported to be an achiever and doing wellbut some early stuttering is reported for him as well.
Continued on Back
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PiychoBOciil History
-iA J "ports an unreiurkable developnental history, except for the occasionalUd stuttering since the age of 6 years. He attended an all-Lie school f"Jpreschool to last year of high school. His perforwnce was "average" becausehe was too fond of playing; for which he was occasionally punished if school
work was neglected. At around the age of 12 years he reportedly began gettinB
serious about school, but does not recall any pressure to do so from external
sources. He attended college at an all-aale school in the Virgin Islands,
after which he migrated to the United States to pursue a graduate degree.' Ayear before graduating his faaily emigrated to the United States.
Mr. S has had a closer relationship with his mother than with his father.
The other is described as very strict, quite frank, soaietiBes forceful, quite
capable, and as a very nice person. The relationship with the father has been
distant, although the client is certain of his father's affection. The father
is described as somewhat iaipersonal, not openly affectionate and indifferent to
eaotional stimuli.
Mr. S has had limited personal contact with females, mainly some early
interaction with cousins. He attributes this to cultural restrictions, but
acknowledges being somewhat shy towards women. He has never dated anyone.
He has not allowed himself to "get close" to any female, because of cultural
restrictions and because he thinks they would not be interested in him anyway.
Mr. S has several male acquaintances with whom he partakes of some entertainment,
such as the movies and sports.
Current Life Situation
Mr. S has completed the requirements for the Masters degree. He is presently
taking some courses and applying for employment. Major sources of stress are
the invariably negative responses he has to the considerably large number of
applications he submits. However, he is confident something will turn up.
Presently, he receives research assistantship stipends, which appear to be
well managed. He acknowledges that he could receive financial assistance
from his parents, if needed. Mr. S also participates regularly in the events
of several local comnunity organizations.
Motivation
Mr. S would like to speak more slowly and to be less apprehensive about
talking. He appears to be interested in finding out why people react negatively
to his verbal approach in order to improve his chances with his interpersonal
relationships
.
Diagnostic Hypothesis
Mr. S appears very sensitive to rejection, and to use a polarized
structuredness and rationalization as a means to avoid rejections. It is
obvious he is fairly distant from his feelings and that basically be may be
an insecure individual. Given the long history of stuttering and anxiety
related to interpersonal interactions, it is possible he may have rationalized
that a speech deficit is the cause of bis deficient relationships.
117
INTAKE SUMMARY
Identificition of patient: Mr W ia • 97 v..- ^-ia ^o. » ,
an org.n.zer for a pubiL .nteres^^gr^u" 'Hrbn'ItJi^drS^ :vrr ! ^ ur.^^^has^not received a degree. He is fros. a .iddle class fa.ily. He curr^???* liJ^s
.
frggenting syptoBs or syndromP: The client stated that feelings of oanirand insecurity have begun to overcome him. and that problems fromh s JajJ Trebeginning to "catch up" with him. He also described having dif ficultieriiJ^a
"
:
'''^'^^^ S'*^ "complicated." and that hewants to be able to resist this urge in the future and stabilize his life.
Mental status
: The client dresses rather casually, often in clothes from
•econd-hand stores, but is always neat in his appearance. There were noIndications of thought disorder or severe psychopathology
, and the client seemedto be highly intelligent and insightful.
,
History of Referring Situation: The client reports that he has been "happy-go-lucky most of his life, but feels that his past is now "catching up" with himHe has not had any previous therapy.
Family Background: W's grandfather was a wealthy businessman, and hisfamily had a middle-class life. Although Mr. W describes his stepfather as
"paranoid," and his mother as "depressed and alcoholic" neither were ever
hospitalized for psychiatric disorder. His brother is a highly successful
administrator and businessman.
Psychologi cal History : Mr. W's father died when the client was 3 years old.
and one of his earliest memories is of the plane flight to his father's funeral.'
He lived with his mother and grandparents until the age of 5, when his mother
remarried. Mr. W describes his stepfather as an extremely rigid, paranoid man
who made life miserable for the family. He speaks with bitterness of this man
who he feels caused most of his current anxieties and self-doubt. He was
frequently punished by this step-father for minor offenses in a way he felt
was arbitrary and overly severe. Mr. W describes his relationship with his
mother as becoming more distant, since his step-father interpreted affection
from the mother to the children as indications of "disloyalty."
As an adolescent, Mr. W was an outstanding high school soccer player "but
was rebellious and uninterested about academics." His brother was labeled by
the family as the "smart one," and Mr. W as the "athletic one."
Mr. W's days in college were marked by frequent incidents of dropping out
of school, moving, and beginning at other schools. He met the woman who became
his wife while at school. His wife began having affairs with other men,
however, and they were divorced after five years of marriage. They have been
apart for about ten years. His wife had a son who Mr. W is convinced was
fathered by another man.
Continued on Back —
^
Since the Mrital breakup, Mr. W has lived with or been in an intensive
relationship with a series of woMn. aaintaining onogany with each for a period
of tiae.
Past Medical History: Mr. W reported feeling a good deal of auscle aches
and other psychosomatic signs in the aonths before beginning therapy. He has
been in good health for aost of his life.
Current Life Situation : Mr. W has been involved in a struggle about whether
to continue his relationship or go on to another woaan. He is working as an
organizer for a local public interest group, and he currently lives alone. He
is friendly with the people he works with, but prefers to spend tisie with his
current love object or by himself. He enjoys running, and other outdoor
activities. Mr. W also participates regularly in the events of several local
coBBunity organizations.
Financial Status : He has a aull incoae fro«> his work and lives quite
odestly, having few aaterial possessions.
Motivation : Mr. W seems highly motivated to understand his past. He is
also highly motivated to ensure that he does not become overly dependent or
involved with me. Thus, keeping him in treatment may be difficult.
Diagnostic Hypotheses : Several issues seem to be especially important to
explore. These include Mr. W's avoidance of complex personal involvements,
constant need for an intense relationship with a woman, difficulties expressing
anger, and feelings of guilt. Exploring the historical roots of these problems,
and helping the client to fully appreciate the role of his early experiences in
the development of his problems, will be quite important.
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CLINICAL JUDGMENT SCALE
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qUISTIORMIU
SSL' 'iM- thU out la •ccord.ac* «lth jout ••••.Dt of th. eUnt notthat .hleh .7 b. livllod h, th. roport.^ ' *T
I. Icnr Bich •nzlat; doao thta patlont mm to havoT
> 2 3 4 J
fir r.Utl,.ly
•«»"" Uttlt iitti,
*>• ""h •nvlrooMntal atr*** doo* thU iMtUnt havt to contaod irtth?
•roat fair raUtlvaly
daal
vary
ount llttl. iittl.
3. Bow aich Inalght do you think thla ^tlant haa Into hta ptoblau?
1 2 3 * J s y
graat
daal
fair
aaouttt
ralativaly
littla
vary
littla
4. flaw ich aotlvatloB for tharapy doaa thla patlaat havaT
1 2 3 4 S « T
graat
daal
fair
aaount
ralativaly
Uttla
vary
littla
S. low VDuld you rata thli patlant'a ovarall anotlonal aaturityT
1 2 3 4 J 7
»»ry
ada^uat
(airly
a adaquata
ralativaly
laadaquata
vary
.
nadaquata
«. How would you charactarlaa thla patlant'a aoclal adJuatatotT
1 2 3 4 J 6 7
»ary fairly
adaquata adaquata
ralativaly
Inadaquata
vary
inadaquata
7. How ich "ago atrangth" doaa thla patlant aaaa to havaT
1 2 3 4 S 6 7
graat
daal
fair
aaount
ralativaly
littla
vary
littla
Conaldartng tha antlra ranga of aantal diaordar, how would you eharactarlca
tha dagraa of diaturhanca in thla patlant? (ehack ona)
totraaaly diaturbad Mildly dlaturbad
Sarioualy dlaturbad
___
Vary aildly dlaturbad
Modarataly dlaturbad
9. riaaaa glva a dlagnoala for thla patlant.
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10. If thU patient were aectpted for piychothcrap;, how iiould you r«t« tht
chancu of hl« "acting out" Intarfaring with traatatnt? (chack one)12 3 4 5 6 7
y*ry fairly relatively very
llk'ly likely unlikely nnllkely
11. Bow ateoalve a change in the patlant'a character atructure would you atteapt?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
great fair relatively very
deal aaounc little Uttle
12. Aaaualng the patient did not tervloate preaaturely, about how long would you
aspect to aee thla patient? (check one)
Laaa than three aontha Fro« eighteen aonthe to two years
fro» three aontha to juat ahort of a year Fro* two to three yeara
Fro« a year to eighteen aontha Longer than thrae yeara
13. Aaaualng that no trcataent were undertaken, how would you rate the prognoala
for thla patient?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very fairly relatively very
favorable favorable unfavorable unfavorable
14. Aaaualng that your recoaacndatlona for treataent were followed, how would
you rate the prognoala for thl* patient?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very fairly relatively very
favorable favorable unfavorable unfavorable
IS. How would you rate your wllllngnca* to accept thla patient for treataent?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very fairly relatively very
willing willing unwilling uowilUng
16. Do you find It aa»y or difficult to eapathlie with thla patient?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
^^Ty fairly relatively very
May eaay difficult difficult
17. How would you characterlie your peraonal reaction to thla patient?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
poaitlve poalt'lve negative negative
18. In a few aenteocea, what would your therapeutic approach and/or goali be
with thla patient. If they would be in any way different frca your uaual
way of working, plaaae deacrlbe.
fairly relatively very
19. (optional) In the apace provided below, pleaae aake
any additional eo
you wlah concerning the patient, your rcaponaea. or
the taak Itaeli.
APPENDIX C
DEMOGRAPHIC AND
IDEOLOGY QUESTIONNAIRE
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THERAPIST BACKGROUND INFORMATIOK
Sex Age ttACK Religion
Family of origin religion
City and State of origin/
-
.' City and State now living
(nation if not US)
Theoretical orientation (check one)
:
Eclectic
Interpersonal
Existential
Cognitive-behavioral
Psychodynamic
Psychoanalytic
Object Relations
Other (Specify)
Ra t iona 1-Eao t ive
Humanistic
Behavioral
If you have checked eclectic, please circle the orientation which most Informs
your work.
Political beliefs:
Strongly liberal
Moderately liberal
Moderately conservative
Strongly conservative
None
Other (specify)
Religious beliefs:
Strongly traditional
Moderately traditional
Other (Specify)
Moderately liberal
Strongly liberal
Socioeconomic background (i.e., family of origin)
Upper upper class
lo%rer upper class
Sexual orientation:
heterosexual
upper middle class
lower middle class
homosexual bisexual
Agnostic
Atheist
upper lover class
lower lower class
other
(specify)

